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China Not a Military Threat 
China Puts Economic Growth Above Hegemony 
JOHN GERSHMAN 
Prior to the attacks of September 11, China appeared to be the Bush administration's prime can-
didate for the target of a new Cold War. 
Campaigning on the idea of China as a 
"strategic competitor," the first few 
months of the Bush administration 
were marked by the largest arms sales 
package to Taiwan in a decade, enthu-
siastic support for theater and national Nanchang celebrates the People's Republic of 
missile defense systems and space China's 50th anniversary. Photo by Robin Carton 
weaponry, and a downgrading of official China's military policy and how it relates 
contacts with China. The spyplane imbro- to the image of China as a strategic com-
glio crystallized these tensions, although petitor and threat, particularly because the 
they had eased by the time of the Septem- policies pursued by the US can have a sig-
her 11 attacks. The Pentagon's 2001 Qua- nificant effect on the evolution of Chinese 
drennial Defense Review released just af- military strategy. 
ter the attacks focused on the threat ofter- Since opening to the world economy in 
rorism but it did note - in an implicit ref- the late 1970s, military modernization has 
erence to China- that "Asia is gradually been subordinated to the imperatives of 
emerging as a region susceptible to large- economic growth and modernization. (It 
scale military competition." was the fourth of Deng Xioaping's "Four 
It is instructive therefore to examine Modernizations.") 
Guest Editors Note: 
This special issue of the Newsletter is devoted solely to China, with articles solicited 
to collectively provide a brief but fairly comprehensive overview of the major dimen-
sions of the country today. Readers wishing documentation for any of the materials 
contained in this issue, or those interested in reprint information, may write to the 
individual author(s) c/o of RESIST. For those seeking longer, more detailed articles on 
contemporary China from a progressive perspective, China: Beyond The Headlines, 
edited by Timothy Weston & Lionel Jensen, is highly recommended (Rowman & Littlefield, 
2000). -Henry Rosemont, Jr. 
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Except for a brief skirmish with Viet-
nam over a disputed South China Sea islet 
in 1988, China has not resorted to the use 
of force since its disastrous attack on Viet-
nam in 1979. By and large, China has acted 
as a satisfied power, having increased eco-
nomic ties with all its neighbors and nego-
tiated border agreements with most neigh-
boring countries. Only in the case of Tai-
wan is there a real danger of conflict. Beijing 
has been quite clear that it is willing to use 
force if Taiwan declares its independence. 
Nuclear Threat 
China offers no serious strategic threat 
to the United States. China now has at most 
about 40 long-range nuclear missiles with 
sufficient range to reach the continental 
United States, and although it has the abil-
ity to place multiple warheads on its mis-
siles, it has so far chosen not to do so. A 
single US nuclear-armed submarine carries 
more warheads than the entire inventory 
of Chinese warheads capable of reaching 
the United States-meaning that even if 
China were to triple its current number of 
nuclear missiles, the strategic balance 
would not be fundamentally altered. The 
Chinese continue to rely on a "minimal de-
terrent" policy and have the barest of abili-
ties to retaliate with nuclear force should 
they come under nuclear attack. 
China's second-generation nuclear 
force, which is to be deployed over the next 
10 to 15 years, will be far more mobile, ac-
curate and reliable than its current force. 
continued on page two 
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Yet this force is likely to remain small in 
comparison to the US nuclear arsenal, even 
if the Bush administration unilaterally re-
duces United States nuclear forces . A criti-
cal factor shaping China's decision on the 
number ofICBMs to deploy will be whether 
China feels that a smaller deterrent will be 
threatened by US national missile defense. 
Increases in China's military spending 
have also garnered some recent press at-
tention. Using the broadest definition of 
such spending- including foreign weap-
ons purchases and research and develop-
ment-China's is roughly $40 to $50 billion 
when corrected for purchasing power par-
ity. This is about equal to what Japan 
spends, while the US spends more than 
seven times as much. The double digit in-
creases in the official military budget over 
the 1990s appears to tell a story of a rap-
idly growing military. But the Chinese mili-
tary was cut from a force of over 4 million 
in the 1980s to fewer than 2.5 million today. 
After rising by 12% in 2000 in real terms, 
official defense spending will increase this 
year by nearly 18%, a rate at which it would 
double every four years. Double-digit in-
creases in nominal defense spending were 
common in the 1990s, but high levels of 
inflation, especially in the early part of the 
decade, offset much of the real value of 
these increases. Much of the increases in 
the 1990s also went into better pay and 
living conditions for the troops and offic-
ers, and in the past two years, as compen-
sation for the forced divestiture of the mili-
tary from commercial enterprises. 
Shifts in Military Forces 
Right-wing hysteria to the contrary, 
China lacks any kind of a "grand strategy" 
that integrates economic, military, and dip-
lomatic efforts in pursuit of foreign policy 
or security objectives. Nevertheless, the 
Party leadership shares some basic strate-
gic goals: regime survival, preserving terri-
torial integrity (namely insuring against 
Taiwan's permanent separation from China, 
preventing Tibetan independence, quell-
ing uprisings among Muslim populations 
in Xinjiang) and increasing China's "com-
prehensive national power" (zonghe guoli) 
and prestige on the international stage. The 
sometimes-conflicting nature of pursuing 
these objectives has shaped military strat-
egy and military modernization. 
In the late 1990s, the Chinese military 
Page 2 
The subordination of military modernization 
to economic growth is largely because 
economic growth is the only policy that helps 
meet Beijing's broader strategic goals. 
shifted from a doctrine concerned with a 
defensive ground war to a doctrine based 
on a more balanced, flexible and smaller 
military able to operate outside of territo-
rial waters. This new doctrine concentrates 
on force and force projection rather than 
simply on national defense. The center-
piece of this emerging doctrine has been 
the Chinese Navy (PLAN), which in the 
past had been regarded as the least impor-
tant among all the services. 
Two major factors contributed to this 
strategic shift. Chief among them is grow-
ing economic and political instability in the 
region, an unclear picture of the US com-
mitment to the area and uncertainty over 
the emerging Japanese role in the region. 
The second factor affecting China's mili-
tary strategy is energy security. China is 
the largest consumer of oil outside of the 
US. China will need to rely more on im-
ported oil to sustain its economic growth. 
Much of this oil is transported by sea, thus 
the increased importance of safeguarding 
sea lines of communication (SLOC). 
China's navy has over 1,100 warships, 
more than three times the number of ships 
in the US Navy. Unlike the US Navy, how-
ever, the PLAN is primarily geared toward 
a coastal defensive role. It has only 54 ma-
jor combatants accounting for only 5% of 
the total number of ships. In the short term, 
the PLAN is developing a "green water" 
capability, meaning the ability to operate 
out to the first island chain- all areas to 
the west of a line running from Japan, the 
Senkaku islands, Taiwan and the west 
coast of Borneo. By 2020, the PLAN aims 
to have the ability to expand this force into 
a "blue water" capable navy, a force able 
to assert control over the second island 
chain, including areas west of the Kuril Is-
lands down to the Mariana islands and 
Papua New Guinea. Although China is 
working hard to develop a more sophisti-
cated green water navy, it is more than 15 
years away from having a significant blue 
water navy. China's air force has only re-
cently changed its doctrine to taking the 
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fight beyond the coast and lacks the refu-
eling capability to operate at any signifi-
cant distance from its shores. 
Taiwan 
Taiwan is widely viewed as the flash-
point that could bring China and the US 
into military confrontation. The key ele-
ments in China's strategy towards Taiwan 
emerged roughly 20 years ago, when it 
made a decisive shift away from a policy of 
confrontation and liberation through the 
use of military force to one of reunification 
through negotiations. Since Chen Shui-
bian's election as Taiwan's president in 
early 2000, China accelerated its efforts to 
expand cross-Straits economic ties. With 
China and Taiwan both in the WTO, these 
ties are likely to continue to increase, mak-
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China Not a Military Threat 
ing war more costly for both sides. 
The critical point is that Taiwan is not a 
military issue for China's leadership, but a 
political one. The Communist Party's po-
litical concerns over losing face on the Tai-
wan issue by allowing its permanent sepa-
ration from the mainland combine three re-
lated issues: sincere nationalism and the 
fear of national breakup; tactical national-
ism and fears about Party legitimacy; and 
individual leaders' fear for their own abil-
ity to survive the succession process and 
to preserve their historical legacies. 
The Bush administration's willingness 
to significantly increase the weapons sold 
to Taiwan earlier this year, and the promi-
nence of supporters of Taiwan's indepen-
dence among top levels of the Bush ad-
ministration have made Beijing more un-
easy than ever about the future of Taiwan. 
China already has a couple of hundred 
short-range ballistic missiles across the 
strait from Taiwan and will likely have sev-
eral hundred near the middle of this decade. 
It does not have the capacity to invade 
Taiwan, a scenario that would be counter-
productive in any event. A more likely sce-
nario would be some kind of blockade com-
bined with missile attacks, and even there, 
China's air force is inferior to Taiwan's. 
Emphasis on Economic Growth 
For China, like other countries, the pur-
suit of strategic interests has been one driv-
ing force behind engagement in interna-
tional organizations and support for multi-
lateral cooperation. However, some specific 
examples highlight ways in which its Party 
leadership has been willing to sacrifice ac-
tual military advantage to avoid being 
viewed as a pariah state operating outside 
the norms of international society. This in-
cludes, most notably, the signing of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996, 
which reduced dramatically the speed of 
China's nuclearweapons developmentprogram. 
The subordination of military modern-
ization to economic growth is largely be-
cause economic growth is the only policy 
that helps meet all of Beijing's broader stra-
tegic goals. It enables the Party to "buy 
off' opposition and to channel funds to 
poorer regions and ethnic minority areas 
to try to prevent violent uprisings. It also 
provides additional leverage over Taiwan, 
as the island becomes increasingly depen-
dent on the mainland economy for trade 
and investment opportunities. Hundreds 
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of thousands of Taiwan citizens live part 
or all of the year in mainland cities such as 
Shenzhen or Shanghai. And Taiwan pro-
vides the resources and tax revenues for 
strengthening China's power overall. For 
the foreseeable future, economic growth 
and the instability associated with the par-
ticular path the Party has chosen to achieve 
such growth will be the major focus of con-
cern for China's leadership, not new mili-
tary adventures. 
The economic, social, and political lim-
its on China's military modernization ex-
plain in large part why China is extremely 
unlikely to become either a peer competi-
tor of the United States or a regional hege-
mon in the security arena during the next 
10 to 15 years. But the trajectory of China's 
military modernization and strategy will also 
be shaped by the policies of other coun-
tries in the region, particularly the US. Reck-
lessly pursuing missile defense and advo-
cating independence for Taiwan strength-
ens hardliners within Chinese policy 
circles, reducing the security of both China 
and the US and making a new Cold War 
with China more likely. A preferable course 
would emphasize verifiable arms control 
initiatives, support for closer cross-Straits 
ties and negotiations between China and 
Taiwan, and strengthened multilateral se-
curity-related institutions in the region. 
John Gershman is a senior analyst at the 
lnterhemispheric Resource Center and 
Asia/Pacific editor for Foreign Policy in 
Focus. 
Aggression or Coexistence? 
China -s Intentions towards Southeast Asia 
ANDREW WELLS-DANG 
China has been all but absent from the media and political mouthpieces ofUS 
elites since September 11, but up until that 
date conservative ideologues and military 
planners were hard at work attempting to 
make the Chinese into the next Cold War 
enemy. It all seems so far away now. The 
fabricated "Cox Commission Report" told 
of supposed Chinese attempts to steal the 
nation's nuclear secrets. The Pentagon's 
Quadrennial Defense Review was poised 
to name China as the main strategic threat 
to US interests and reorient military deploy-
ments and targets towards Asia. Rumors 
flew of Chinese capabilities to nuke Los 
Angeles if the US defended Taiwan in a 
conflict. After Chinese fighters collided 
with a US spy plane in April, Chinese-
Americans were singled out for the same 
ignorant prejudice that Arabs and Sikhs 
are today. China, the rising power in Asia, 
threatened American dominance ( another 
word for "hegemony" or "empire"). 
Of course, now that global terrorism has 
been identified as the enemy du }our, con-
frontation with China no longer seems im-
minent. But the underlying question of 
China's role in the world will not be going 
away. Once the current war is over and 
done with, Washington elites will still need 
an enemy, and China will still have 1.3 bil-
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lion people and an independent foreign 
policy. The debate over Chinese intentions 
may be on hold for now, but it will certainly 
be back with a vengeance soon enough. 
Before jumping to any conclusions 
about China's intentions towards the US, 
however, it might be helpful to assess per-
ceptions of China among its neighbors, 
peoples who deal with the Chinese on a 
much more immediate level than Americans 
generally do. Those who take alarmist 
views of Chinese intentions might be sur-
prised to learn that Southeast Asians gen-
erally do not share these concerns, instead 
viewing China as a partner with fairly be-
nign intent. 
China and the Asian Neighborhood 
Historically speaking, China's involve-
ment in Southeast Asia has been economic 
and cultural rather than military or politi-
cal. With the exception of northern Viet-
nam, which China occupied for a thousand 
years and periodically attempted to retake 
during the Yuan and Ming dynasties, China 
has never shown expansionistic desires 
towards the south. (Indeed, Vietnam might 
well be described as a country that used to 
be part of China, but then became inde-
pendent-a feat that the Tibetans and 
Uighurs, not to mention the Zhuang or Bai 
minorities, have so far been unable to 
continued on page four 
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match.) In place of armies or missionaries, 
China sent traders and merchants. Ethnic 
Chinese migrants have long dominated 
economic activity in the region, a pattern 
that has generally functioned smoothly in 
Malaysia and Thailand, less so in Indone-
sia or Vietnam. Chinese products and tech-
no logy flooded urban markets, though 
China made little or no effort to use its in-
fluence in local politics. 
Southeast Asia's historical coexistence 
with China was interrupted by European 
colonialism, then by Japanese occupation 
and Cold War rivalries. From 1950 through 
the 1970s, ideology separated China ( and 
North Vietnam) from the Southeast Asian 
nations dominated by the US. When five 
of these nations- Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines-
formed the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, anti-communism 
was a key motivating factor. 
With the decline of ideological commu-
nism and China's re-entry into international 
economics and politics under Deng 
Xiaoping, however, ASEAN's character 
also changed. The association now con-
sists of 10 countries, including Cambodia, 
Laos and Vietnam, as well as Brunei and 
Burma (Myanmar). With a variety of politi-
cal systems, the ASEAN countries are no 
longer unified on many issues, but all en-
joy increasingly good relations with China. 
As a result, China's economic and cul-
tural exchange with Southeast Asia is re-
turning to its historical levels. Chinese-pro-
duced clothing, televisions and pirated 
CDs are everywhere in the region. Eco-
nomic nationalists sometimes object on 
grounds of protecting domestic industry, 
but the Chinese presence is there to stay. 
Especially in the poorer ASEAN nations-
Laos, Cambodia and Burma-China is a 
major investor and donor of development 
assistance. Ethnic Chinese across the region 
are re-establishing ties with the mainland, 
and nouveaux riches Chinese nationals are 
arriving in growing numbers as tourists. 
From the Southeast Asian point of view, 
China is still the big neighbor to the north. 
By virtue of size alone, it will always be 
treated with respect. ASEAN has sought 
to include China in its own consultations 
through the "ASEAN + 1" and ( along with 
Japan and South Korea) the "ASEAN + 3" 
gatherings, as well as the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) to address security concerns. 
continued on page seven 
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Myths and Realities 
CATHERINE LYNCH 
News of US-China relations, as with other international news in the US, is 
episodic and ephemeral. Reports of visits 
to the US by the Dalai Lama or the presi-
dent of Taiwan, of arrests in China of US-
based Chinese scholars, even news of the 
collision of a US spy plane and a Chinese 
jet, appear suddenly and then disappear. 
Yet there are ready, mythic formulae 
through which these events are perceived, 
making them immediately recognizable. 
These enduring myths hinder more reflec-
tive consideration of the relations between 
the US and China. 
The myth through which Americans 
tend to perceive China tells us that the 
Chinese government is militantly opposed 
to human rights and is aggressively expan-
sionist. While its current form is congru-
ent with the popular prophecy of a coming 
"clash of civilizations," our China myth has 
historical roots going back to before our 
" loss of China" to Communism in 1949 at 
the start of the Cold War. Where earlier we 
spoke of Nationalist China, followed by 
Nationalist Taiwan (until recently a one-
party state) as "Free China," now we speak 
of the Tibetan emigre community ( a theoc-
racy) as "Free Tibet." Using the Korean 
War as an excuse, the US sent its Seventh 
Fleet into the Taiwan Straits, some 700 hun-
dred miles to the south. Nearly half a cen-
tury later, in 1996, the US again sent two 
aircraft carriers into the Straits. China, in 
the first case as part of world Communism, 
and in the second case, still Communist, 
apparently an aggressive state wit];i expan-
sive designs, was a state in need of con-
tainment. 
Our myths concerning China are mir-
rored by myths in China of the US. China 
counters our trumpeting of human rights 
with "Asian values" and a critique of the 
failings of US society. With historical roots 
going back to the experience of the nine-
teenth century, an image of the West per-
suasive to the Chinese portrays imperialis-
tic powers bent on dominating China rather 
than according it an equal position in the 
world. Chinese Communism effects a stance 
of national restoration in the face of a West-
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em, and now specifically American, hege-
mony. A pattern of the US threatening to 
invade China during the Korean War con-
tinues today with the 1999 bombing of the 
Chinese embassy in Belgrade, an act of war 
in which four people were killed, and the 
collision of a US spy plane at the Chinese 
border with a defending Chinese jet whose 
pilot was killed. 
Recent moves by the Bush administra-
tion have bolstered China's myths, despite 
opportunities for alternative policies. Af-
ter drifting for some time, the Clinton ad-
ministration had arrived toward its end at a 
policy of "engagement" with China. Bush 
has moved back to the Cold War policy of 
"containment." Bush's "Blue Team" of 
China advisors, so named after the Ameri-
can side in the US Space Command's simu-
lated war games this past January against 
the "Red Team" representing China, in-
cluded no China experts, who were seen as 
being soft on China. The result is an in-
creasingly aggressive stance toward China, 
with stepped up aerial electronic spying at 
China's borders (which bad begun in the 
last months of the Clinton administration). 
It is also evident in the Bush administration's 
withdrawal from the Tokyo Accords on the 
environment and in its proposal of a new 
version of Star Wars. 
In his rejection of the Tokyo Protocol 
on global warming, Bush criticized China, 
along with India, for backing lower green 
house gas standards for developing coun-
tries than developed ones. True to China's 
myth of the US, Bush appeared to be try-
ing to thwart China's economic growth. The 
National Missile Defense program (NMD) 
and associated Theatre Missile Defense 
(TMD) are clearly aimed at China. [See 
Bruce Gagnon, "Missile Defense is a Tro-
jan Horse," RESIST Newsletter, October 
2001 , 10:8.] With TMD systems encircling 
China and the prospect of a functional 
NMD, the deterrent value of China's tiny 
nuclear arsenal- fewer than 50 nuclear mis-
siles as opposed to the US 's 7 ,500-plus-
would disappear, leaving China vulnerable 
to US attack. 
China and the US do share some com-
mon ground. Both governments have had 
economic and financial interests in seeing 
China successfully become a member of 
continued on page seven 
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HENRY ROSEMONT, JR. 
In the conduct of its foreign affairs, China was noticeably cooperative and concil-
iatory throughout 2001. It was not belli-
cose in disputes with Vietnam and the Phil-
ippines over ownership of several groups 
of large rocks in the South China Sea; it 
accepted less than a formal apology from 
the US for a spy plane 's intrusion into Chi-
nese-claimed air space; Jiang Zemin's meet-
ing with George Bush in late October was 
cordial, if not warm; the government made 
trade concessions to ease its accession to 
the World Trade Organization, and still oth-
ers in its successful bid for the 2008 Olym-
pic Games; and it made no sabre-rattling 
statements to Taiwan either before or after 
the parliamentary elections in early Decem-
ber, in which the Guomindang- the most 
pro-unification party on the island now- suf-
fered a humiliating defeat, losing control of 
the legislature for the first time since 1949. 
The US world-wide "War on Terrorism" 
should contribute significantly to continu-
ing these conciliatory foreign policies in 
2002. While China cannot do much in the 
conduct of this war, and however much the 
administration wants to see it as a threat to 
"national security," the US can ill afford to 
alienate the Middle Kingdom from the coa-
lition Bush and Powell must hold together 
to prosecute the war. This is particularly 
true if Europe begins to show signs of dis-
engagement. The Chinese government cer-
tainly endorses the destruction of Al Qaeda 
networks in order to maintain stability 
among its eight million Muslim Uighurs in 
Xinjiangprovince (1 ,000 of whom, accord-
ing to the foreign ministry, have been 
trained by Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan). And while the new US-Pakistan 
relation will cut into China's arms sales, 
the problem of nuclear weaponry falling 
into the hands of extremists now falls to 
the US, not China. 
It is all to the good that China faces no 
imminent crises or problems abroad, for it 
has a surfeit of them on the domestic front: 
growing labor unrest in the cities and peas-
ant uprisings in the countryside; ever-
growing disparities between the haves and 
have-nots, and between the coastal regions 
and inland; escalating environmental deg-
Vol. 11, #1 
radation; wholesale corruption; a steady 
decline in the status of women; increased 
economic competition from abroad-de-
manded by WTO accession- combined 
with woefully inefficient banking, tax, and 
social services administrations to meet that 
competition; and intimately linked to all of 
these problems, the loss of the country's 
moral compass. 
The Plight of Workers and Peasants 
Even the state-controlled media regu-
larly report urban unrest among workers 
whose economic conditions are wretched. 
The Zhengzhou municipality's statistics 
bureau, for example, reported that pension-
ers from its factories have received less 
than one-sixth of their stipends for the past 
4 years, while a number of workers in an-
other industrial city farther north-
Shenyang- have not been paid since 2000. 
Demonstrations protesting these condi-
tions are growing both in size and number, 
and government responses have become 
more draconian, with beatings and arrests 
now common. Official records claim 60,000 
incidents of urban labor protests for 1998, 
growing to 100,000 in 1999. 
In rural areas the number of protests may 
be three times higher, as farmers are not 
paid for their crops---or issued worthless 
scrip--and are being swindled out of their 
land. Much is being made of the growing 
number of millionaires in Shanghai, Beijing 
and Guangzhou, but 50 million of China's 
rural poor still subsist on less than $1 a 
day ( official figures), and nearly three times 
that many must live on $2 a day. 
The plight of rural women is particularly 
gruesome. With over 125 million men 
obliged to leave their villages to become 
the "floating population" working· in the 
cities- at low wages and no benefits- the 
women must assume full responsibility for 
the feeding, care, and well-being of the eld-
erly, the sick, and the young as well as work 
the fields left by the men, with little or no 
labor-saving equipment. Against this back-
ground certain appalling statistics should 
come as no surprise: with 18% of the 
world's population of women, China ac-
counts for almost 60% of female suicides, 
and is the only country where female sui-
cides outnumber the male. 
A large number of urban women are not 
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appreciably better off than their rural sis-
ters. They, too face economic hardship 
when their working husbands are not paid, 
not to mention losing their own salaries 
and pensions as well. 
But the problem is more general. After 
liberation in 1949 the Party and government 
made significant strides in overcoming the 
inferior status of women, but the gains are 
eroding. Very few women occupy positions 
of power or influence in the upper echelons 
of the Party or government; an increasing 
number of opinion pieces in the media ar-
gue that if more women returned to the 
hearth there would be enough jobs for men; 
few of the new millionaires are women; fe-
male infanticide has not abated apprecia-
bly, nor has the practice of selling young 
girls to sweatshops or brothels. 
The Environment 
The Chinese natural environment is an 
ecologist's nightmare. Water tables on the 
North China plains have dropped 150 feet 
since 1949, and some official estimates pre-
dict that unless the situation is reversed, 
not merely halted, Beijing may become un-
inhabitable by 2015. Less than 3% of the 
land mass- 1/5 larger than the continental 
US- remains forested. Over 75% of China's 
sewage flows untreated into its streams and 
rivers. The amount of land reclaimed for 
agriculture each year is less than the 
amount lost to desertification. Six of the 
ten cities in the world with the highest lev-
els of air pollution are in China, and fully a 
fifth of the residents therein suffer some 
form of chronic respiratory disease. Even 
the plight of the pandas and other endan-
gered species unique to China has wors-
ened in recent years, owing to both loss of 
habitat, and profits to be made from their 
sale, or the sale of their pelts, or their or-
gans for medicinal or aphrodisiacal purposes. 
Economic Reform and the WTO 
It is now a decade since Deng Xiaoping 
announced on his Southern tour that "To 
get rich is glorious," signaling a renewal of 
the economic reforms that had begun in 
the 1980s, but halted in the aftermath of 
the Beijing Massacre of June 1989. By any 
standard the overall economic conditions 
of the country have improved consider-
ably since then. Food and clothing are in 
abundance, as are refrigerators, TVs, air con-
ditioners, and not a few lux items as well: 
continued on page six 
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continued from page five 
Huaihai Road in central Shanghai looks 
very much like Rodeo Drive in Hollywood. 
This leap in productivity has not been 
matched, however, by fundamental changes 
in the banking or legal systems, nor in agen-
cies supposedly responsible for environ-
mental protection, corporate oversight, tax 
collection, or social services. Without these 
major reforms, it will be increasingly diffi-
cult to sustain economic growth. 
A key example of these problems, and 
their interconnections, is the banking sys-
tem. The government requires banks to 
make and re-make major loans at low inter-
est rates ( currently 5%) to large-scale state 
enterprises that have not been profitable 
for some time, and may never become so 
again. This policy is of course a capitalist's 
nightmare, but there is a reason for main-
taining it: China has no equivalent of Medi-
care, Social Security, FHA ( or even a func-
tioning IRS); all social services in the cit-
ies-from housing to day care to health 
clinics to pensions- are provided by the 
factory unit which employ the workers, 
hence shutting down the factory shuts 
down all the services on which the work-
ers and their families depend. 
Worse, the present system invites mas-
sive corruption. The market rate for loans 
is currently 12%, so it certainly must tempt 
entrepreneurs to bribe banking officials to 
make loans at the government rate. Econo-
mists at Beijing University recently esti-
mated that $34 billion (US) has illegally 
changed hands in this way in recent years. 
Another untoward effect of the current 
banking system is that the size and number 
of loans that must be made to state enter-
prises each year severely reduces the mon-
ies available for the purchase of such things 
as automobiles by individual consumers. 
Shortly after WTO rules go into effect in 
China, however, overseas automobile com-
panies like GM and Volkswagen will be able 
to provide their own financing for their cars, 
placing domestic manufacturers thereof at 
a great competitive disadvantage. 
Indeed, all Chinese domestic producers 
will be playing on a distinctively uneven 
field for the China market after WTO ac-
cession. Many of these firms have some 
capital, market access, know-how, hard-
working employees, and produce high qual-
ity goods and services. But it remains true 
that the large multinational corporations 
employ the preponderance of knowledge 
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A "rugged individualism" ethical orientation 
is seen as anathema to most, 
but necessary for survival today. 
workers, with state-of-the-art electronic 
technology available for their managers and 
financial "deep pockets." It is for this rea-
son that the Chinese government moved so 
slowly in 2001 toward WTO accession: it 
continues to request concessions from the 
organization in order to maintain a modi-
cum of regulative control over domestic 
commerce ( an idea deemed important by 
the framers of the US Constitution as well). 
Drawing on the example of South Af-
rica, the government is also seeking licens-
ing permission to produce several generic 
medicines, including the AIDS cocktail (the 
UN estimated a million cases of AIDS in 
China for 2001 ). Very probably it is also 
attempting to develop a "dual use" policy 
for its defense budget: WTO rules permit 
protective legislation to harbor industries 
deemed essential for a country's national 
security, and China's recent efforts to up-
grade its military may in part be designed 
simply to continue to protect certain do-
mestic industries-especially large state-
owned ones. 
Why Be Moral? 
If there is a central thread woven 
throughout these social, political, and eco-
nomic problems facing China today, it is 
the moral thread; the country seems to be 
adrift today in its value orientation. The 
Party lost part of its moral status during 
the upheavals it itself created during the 
Cultural Revolution of 1966-76. Its moral 
bankruptcy became obvious to all during 
the Beijing Massacre of June 3-6, .1989. 
And the problems created by its policies 
during these periods do not allow for moral 
solutions that will promote the good, or 
even mitigate evil. 
Most educated Chinese today are awash 
in opportunities to enhance their economic 
well being. Many of them are doing so in 
accordance with Deng's slogan, and there 
is little check on this impulse, in part be-
cause economic liberalization reduces the 
Party's ability to re-institute the draconian 
ethos of the Cultural Revolution. 
Yet there is a pressing question abroad 
in China today, namely, "What does it mean 
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to be Chinese?" A socialist, egalitarian 
ethos cannot continue to have any pur-
chase when the government encourages 
competition among Hong Kong's multi-
millionaires to become the first capitalist to 
join the Chinese Communist Party. A state-
sponsored (in the North) resurgence of in-
terest in the Confucian heritage of China 
emphasizes its regressive, and not progres-
sive dimensions, and hence is not appeal-
ing to those anxious to emulate the West. 
A "rugged individualism" ethical orienta-
tion is seen as anathema to most, but nec-
essary for survival today, and hence fol-
lowed even when vilified. 
Even when not harassed-or worse-
by the authorities, religious organizations 
are not gaining many adherents, especially 
among the educated; little moral rejuvena-
tion can be expected from this source. 
New Vision Needed 
A renewed moral vision is sorely needed 
in China today. The earlier economic re-
forms have raised measurably the standard 
ofliving of many Chinese, perhaps as many 
as 400-plus million of them. But that means 
the quality oflife of over 800 million Chi-
nese has remained static, or declined. A 
more just distribution of the country's pro-
ductive wealth will not, in the end, be 
brought about solely by economic, politi-
cal or social policies, but by a moral com-
mitment to do so on the part of all Chinese. 
Similarly, it must be moral arguments that 
will bring to an end human rights abuses 
(which are real, even if regularly overblown 
in the US media), insure gender equality, 
bring a greater degree of autonomy for Ti-
betans and other minority peoples in China, 
and generate an abiding commitment to 
repair its natural environments for future 
generations. 
All of this is necessary if China is not 
merely to continue to "stand up," but stand 
tall in the politics among nations in the 
twenty-first century, as it has often done 
in the past. 
Henry Rosemont, Jr. has been a member 
of the RESIST Board since 1969. 
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Aggression or Coexistence? 
continued from page four 
Some progress has been made on these 
fronts, including a Sino-Vietnamese bor-
der treaty. One large outstanding issue re-
mains, namely sovereignty over several 
piles of rocks and oil fields in the South 
China Sea, but regional dialogue has at least 
prevented the dispute from escalating. 
There is, however, one strong exception 
to the above positive picture: Taiwan. 
Beijing's leaders, especially those in the 
People's Liberation Anny, have made no 
secret of their willingness to use force 
against Taiwan if peaceful means of reuni-
fication fail. The fact that China's tactics 
have leaned more towards bullying than 
persuasion have not endeared the idea of 
unification to many Taiwanese. For their 
part, Southeast Asians hope the Taiwan 
issue will be resolved nonviolently, as the 
ASEAN countries have economic and cul-
tural ties with Taiwan that are in some cases 
at least as great as with the mainland. [See 
Gershman article on page one for more in-
formation.] 
Americans should have nothing to fear 
from the growing ties between China and 
Southeast Asia. If China is not threatening 
its neighbors, how could it possibly pose 
a security risk to the US? A peaceful, pros-
perous and culturally vibrant Asia contrib-
utes to international stability. More spe-
cifically, clear-thinking progressives should 
encourage multi-polar alternatives to 
American corporate and political domi-
nance, holding out at least the possibility 
of a different development model than the 
one the US and its World Bank/IMF lack-
eys have rammed down small countries' 
throats. ASEAN stands little chance of cre-
ating an effective alternative on its own, 
but with Chinese support its prospects are 
somewhat better. 
In the few cases where Chinese involve-
ment does come with disagreeable strings 
attached (for instance, opposition to a 
Khmer Rouge tribunal in Cambodia, or sup-
port of the Burmese military junta), West-
ern countries can balance Chinese influ-
ence through other multilateral means. A 
China that is engaged in Asia and the world 
will also be more open to international pres-
sure. Given that China puts its economic 
interests first, it can often be persuaded to 
drop political concerns if trade or develop-
ment appears at risk. 
Given the growing connections between 
China and its neighbors, it should be 
Vol. 11, #I 
pointed out that the sort of demonizing of 
China that occurred prior to September 11 
hurts American interests not only in China 
but in the rest of Asia as well. Southeast 
Asians prefer to keep good relations with 
all major powers where possible. If they 
are forced to choose between China and 
the US, however, size and geographical 
considerations alone impel them towards 
the neighbor to the north. The US would 
do well not to insist on creating another 
divided world. 
Andrew Wells-Dang is the Washington 
representative of the Fund for Reconcili-
ation and Development, advocating for 
normal relations between the US, 
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. He can be 
reached at frdwash@mindspring.com. 
US-China Relations 
continued from page four 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). And 
China played a role in restricting the extent 
of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. They 
share interests in law enforcement, includ-
ing control of drugs, illegal immigration, 
copyright infringement, and-since Sep-
tember I I-terrorism, as the US joins China, 
already facing its own Islamic terrorists in 
its northwest. Finally, both China and the 
US have worked together in negotiating 
with North Korea. 
Despite this common ground, the Bush 
administration has adopted the Cold War 
approach of confrontation and contain-
ment. In so doing it has increased tensions 
and the potential for conflict in the region. 
Bush pulled away from discussions with 
North Korea, increased arms sales to Tai-
wan, and tilted toward Japan, including 
both of these under his missile defense 
umbrella. The September 11 th attacks on the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon ap-
peared to open the way for new, more co-
operative policies. However, while it has 
changed some things, September 11 th has 
not changed everything. The recent US an-
nouncement that it would cease to be a 
party in the ABM treaty signals that, de-
spite rhetoric about a war on terrorism, the 
US will continue to wage a new cold war 
on China. 
Bush's policy to "contain" a threaten-
ing China has the effect of solidifying cor-
responding Chinese images of a hostile US 
bent on denying China its rightful posi-
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tion. And governments not only maintain 
myths through their actions but also can 
be constrained to act within them. The US 
pushes China toward its own myth of na-
tional restoration and its determination to 
hold on to Tibet and to reintegrate its old 
territories, most notably Taiwan. A con-
frontational US enhances the political po-
sition of hard liners in the Chinese govern-
ment and fosters a nationalism which weak-
ens domestic critics. Younger Chinese, in 
contrast to the older democratic activists, 
have been increasingly drawn to the rheto-
ric of nationalism. 
But talk of relations between states and 
their governments tends to constrict our 
thinking, preventing us from seeing how 
mythologizing one country can serve the 
interests of the other. We might, for ex-
ample, realize that the US portrayal of China 
as an expansionist power running roughshod 
over human rights serves US interests as 
an arms exporter in an unstable world. We 
might equally realize that while there are 
most certainly human rights abuses in 
China, the stock image of China as the worst 
abuser and Tibet as the greatest victim is 
hardly consistent with a balanced appraisal 
of a world in which far worse abusers are in 
the camp of US allies. 
To take another example, on the issue 
of China and the WTO, US labor argued 
against the engagement stance of support-
ing China's membership on the basis of 
China's poor human rights record, when 
their basic concern, of course, was cheap 
competition. Our myth of China as a hu-
man rights abuser has tempted us away 
from the real issue which is not whether 
China is worthy of membership in the WTO 
but the WTO itself, which does not serve 
the best interests of either the Chinese or 
US workers. 
Thus our choices are not confined to 
only containment or engagement. What we 
should do, instead of taking sides in a de-
bate shaped by our myths, is take our clues 
from progressive potentials which are 
emerging within Chinese society, in a labor 
movement, in an environmental movement, 
or in village protests-movements which 
US progressives can overwhelmingly en-
dorse. 
Catherine Lynch teaches modern 
Chinese history at Eastern Connecticut 
State University. 
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RESIST awards grants six times a year to 
groups throughout the United States en-
gaged in activism for social and economic 
justice. In this issue of the Newsletter we 
list a Jew grant recipients from our Decem-
ber 2001 allocation cycle. For informa-
tion, contact the groups at the addresses 
below. 
Philippine Forum 
122 West 27th Street, 10th Floor 
New York, NY 10001 
philforum@juno.com 
Since 1996, the Philippine Forum has 
sought to bring the Filipino-American 
community into the movement for eco-
nomic and social justice. As a multi-issue 
organization, they work to appeal to the 
broadest audience within their commu-
nity. Through one of their programs, the 
Youth Initiative for Social Action (YISA), 
they raise the social, political, and cul-
tural consciousness of Filipino-American 
youth through training in direct action 
and advocacy techniques. Their YISA 
Activists Summer Camp is designed to 
make youth familiar with the social and 
cultural history of their Filipino/Filipino-
American communities as well as issues 
(;RANTS 
that particularly affect these communi-
ties, including the roles of global institu-
tions such as the IMF and World Bank. 
Resist awarded the Philippine Forum a 
grant of$2,600 to fund the operating 
costs of the summer camp. 
Action for Community and 
Ecology in the Regions of 
Central America (ACERCA) 
PO Box 57 
Burlington, VT 05402 
ACERCA is a US-based organization 
addressing social and environmental 
justice issues throughout Central 
America. Through various campaigns, 
ACERCA links communities working 
toward ecological, social, and economic 
self-determination in the region. In re-
cent months they have made connections 
between the war in Afghanistan and on-
going military and economic assaults 
against Central American communities. 
Resist's grant of $2,600 will be used to 
fund solidarity organizing against the "War 
on Terrorism" and to hold a community 
teach-in, which will make connections 
between Central American issues and the 
anti-war/ anti-globalization movements. 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Join the Resist Pledge Program 
We'd like you to consider 
becoming a Resist Pledge. 
Pledges account for over 
30% of our income. 
By becoming a pledge, you help 
guarant~e Resist a fixed and dependable 
source of income on which we can 
build our grant-making program. 
In return, we will send you a monthly 
pledge letter and reminder along with 
your newsletter. We will keep you 
up-to-date on the groups we have 
funded and the other work being done 
at Resist. 
So take the plunge and become a Resist 
Pledge! We count on you, and the 
groups we fund count on us. 
Yes/ I'll become a 
RESIST Pledge. 
I'll send you my pledge of $ __ 
every month/quarter/six months/ 
year (circle one). 
[ ] Enclosed is an initial pledge 
contribution of $ ___ . 
[ ] I can't join the pledge program 
now, but here's a contribution of 
$ ___ to support your work. 
Name ________ _ 
Address _______ _ 
City/State/Zip _____ _ 
Phone ________ _ 
Donations to Resist are tax-deductible. 
Resist • 259 Elm Street • Suite 201 • Somerville • MA • 02144 
• 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
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Idaho Hispanic Caucus 
Institute for Research 
and Education 
PO Box 1445 
Boise, ID 83701; Asanch46@qwest.net 
The Idaho Hispanic Caucus Institute for 
Research and Education (IHC) initially 
emerged as a volunteer organization to 
influence redistricting efforts in Idaho. It 
has since turned its attention to building 
a statewide coalition of Latino organiza-
tions to advocate for social justice for 
Latinos and people of color in Idaho. 
Through this coalition they hope both to 
build the political influence of Latino 
communities in Idaho and empower com-
munity leaders to organize around the 
social and economic issues facing their 
communities. 
RESIST awarded IHC a grant of $2,100 
for general support. 
Oregon Human Rights Coalition 
2710 NE 14th 
Portland, OR 97212 OHRC01@aol.com 
Oregon Human Rights Coalition has 
been organizing against punitive welfare 
reform laws for more than 10 years. 
Through their education and community 
organizing work, OHR offers tools for 
low-income people to advocate for them-
selves on behalf of their communities. 
Currently they are focusing their orga-
nizing work on the state's Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families re-authori-
zation policy through self-advocacy 
trainings, community organizing, and 
public education events. 
Resist awarded a $1,800 grant for 
general support of their organizing. 
2001 RESIST 
Grant Totals 
Multi-YearGrants: ........... $51,000.00 
Emergency Grants: ............ $2,100.00 
Priority Grants: .............. $245,800.00 
NWTRCC: ......................... $2,574.50 
TOTAL: .... .......... ....... .... $301,474.50 
# Groups Funded: ...................... 136 
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